Dedichiamo un thread a sta robaccia chiamata MBS, visto che le operazioni di mercato aperto della FED di venerdi' scorso le hanno avute come oggetto di scambio. C'e' un altro articolo che ne parla, oltre quello del Mises gia' richiamato nel thread "problemi nel money market", di John P. Hussman, piuttosto esaustivo e dal titolo Hardly a Bailout. Hussman tende a minimizzare quanto avvenuto, dicendo che per ora non c'e' stato nessun bailout (beh in fondo e' vero), ma non si venga a dire che non c'e' MORAL HAZARD... il moral hazard c'e' eccome, gia' a priori e' la banca centrale stessa che fomenta MORAL HAZARD con la sua presenza, ma con gli interventi e le politiche monetarie degli ultimi 15 anni non ha fatto altro che sollecitare massimi livelli di MORAL HAZARD non solo nel sistema finanziario, ma in tutto quello economico, fino a fare vittime per la seconda volta tra la gente normale (prima quelli che comprarono azioni della tech bubble, ora tutti i poveri cristi che si sono indebitati con un mutuo e ora non riescono a pagare).


"Now, the size of the operation ($38 billion) was  unusual, as was the scale with which the Fed allowed dealers to submit mortgage-backed securities as collateral, rather than simply Treasury and agency securities. My impression is that in doing so, the Fed had no intent of “bailing out” the mortgage backed market,or of creating a huge “moral hazard” by absorbing losses for the irresponsible behavior of lenders . Rather, the Fed had  to allow submission of mortgage-backed securities because that's what the banks actually own, and it's precisely the collateral for which the banks can't find a buyer".
...
The Fed does not assume a risk of loss unless the bank  defaults on the repurchase agreement with the Fed (whether the mortgages underlying the collateral go belly up is of secondary importance, because it is relevant only if the bank is already in default, and at that point, believe me, we've got bigger problems).
...
The Fed has an interest in stabilizing the banking system and the real economy. It has no interest in taking the private sector's loss for the irresponsible lending practices of recent years, nor in saving overly aggressive hedge funds from the losses on their leveraged bets. Again, the Fed did exactly what it was supposed to do on Friday. There will inevitably be enormous losses taken as a result of mortgage defaults – but don't assume it will be the Fed that takes them.[/b]



No le perdite sui mortgage default, fenomeno dovuto e riconducibile interamente alle politiche monetarie della FED che ho aspramente criticato negli anni scorsi, se le prendono in quel posto i soliti poveri cristi. Che perdite deve prendersi la FED??? per coprirle basta che stampi!!!! e inoltre tutto quanto stampato in eccesso viene ancora una volta ridistribuito ai soliti noti che si sono gia' arricchiti abbastanza in passato, ricevendo per primi il denaro stampato negli ultimi 10 anni.

chi ha detto che lo faccia? o meglio, chi ha detto che non ci sia un costo? il business cycle mi pare sufficiente come teoria.

Non sono d'accordissimo con quanto sopra scritto da Francesco: il lassismo monetario non incentiva il moral hazard in sé, quanto il malinvestment; il moral hazard è un prodotto successivo, il risultato del bailing out che può esser sia ottenuto spingendo l'offerta di moneta in sé, ma soprattutto con interventi mirati come i riacquisti della Fed di MBS che si vedono all'orizzonte. Se poi si vuol definire il moral hazard un tipo di malinvestment o viceversa, diventa un problema di definizioni e si va in semantica, ma credo ci siamo capiti.

Gary North su (Im)Moral Hazard di qualche anno fa:

Fiat Money and the Immoral Hazard

"Central bankers have created the sense that they can keep the economic system functioning through timely intervention: additional credit money. They have created the credit money necessary to sustain the growth of their national economies. Their actions have made debt – leverage – profitable. Senior managers think, "If central bankers can reduce corporate risk by intervening with more money, then why not bet the farm on complex credit-debt arrangements that can make higher-than-market rates of return?" This is what the central bankers call moral hazard: a widespread perception of reduced risk on the down side, and the pressure of an ever-increasing supply of money and rising prices on the other, driving the entire investment world into debt, playing the leverage game".
....

"Central banks are in control of money. They have addicted the whole world to massive debt, ever more complex. Any slowdown in the inflation of the money supply threatens the solvency of the entire economy. Ludwig von Mises warned against this ninety years ago, in his Theory of Money and Credit (1912). He warned that the government's refusal to call a halt to monetary inflation – its return to credit-money creation – would eventually destroy the currency. He called this the crack-up boom. In the meantime, we would get endless boom-bust cycles, he said. So we have.

Let me repeat the journalist's warning about buying shares of bankrupt firms: "Gambling involves much hope, little thought and leaves you with the irrepressible urge to repeat your mistakes." But what happens when bad accounting practices, complex debt, and endless monetary expansion persuade investors to buy what are in effect bankrupt companies – companies that are kept afloat only by new injections of bank credit money? The central bankers dare not stop the flow of money. And so the leverage game goes on and on. We are riding the tiger, a tiger of endless debt and capitalized future income streams: derivatives".

Ancora iniezioni di moral hazard, del resto non era questo il fattore sul quale puntavo per il rialzo del settore bancario assicurativo?

Bayerische LB di proprietà statale, non quotata (per fortuna) oggi fa un altro pesantissimo writedowns di 4.5 bilioni di eurozzi ed ecco cosa si legge in giro:

traders speculated Germany's second-biggest state-owned bank will be bailed out after reporting $6.7 billion in credit-market writedowns.

Some of Bayern's losses would be covered by both the State of Bavaria and the essentially government-run savings banks,'' said Tim Brunne, a Munich-based credit analyst at UniCredit SpA,

The market now believes that no regulator in any of the major markets would allow their big financial institutions to fail,

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